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Abstract
The far reach of United States antitrust laws has been a source of considerable irritation to
many allies of the United States. There is a proceeding by the Commission of the European
Communities against International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). IBM has argued that
the Commission must use a balancing test of state interests when deciding the case. However,
this would involve changing the EEC’s methods of evaluating its jurisdiction over conduct abroad.
This Comment discusses whether such a change is desireable by 1) examing the principle as it
evolved in the United States, 2) the EEC’s current practice in such matters and 3) the pertinent
rules of international law.
DEFINING JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS IN INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: SHOULD THE EEC ADOPT
THE TIMBERLANE APPROACH?
INTRODUCTION
The application of United States antitrust laws to conduct by
foreigners abroad has been politely described as a "cause for con-
cern amongst friends of America."' The far reach of United States
antitrust laws has, in fact, been a source of considerable irritation
to many allies of the United States. 2  United States courts have
utilized a "poorly defined"3 standard to bring foreign conduct
within the purview of United States antitrust laws. 4  On numerous
occasions they have affected sensitive foreign interests., The result
has been a plethora of government protests6 and foreign statutes
directed at curbing United States antitrust enforcement efforts that
extend abroad. 7
1. Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern
Amongst Friends of America, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1979). See Extraterritoriality:
Conflict and Overlap in National and International Regulation, 1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
Pnoc. 30, 36 (remarks by R.W. Burchill).
2. See infra notes 62-88 and accompanying text.
3. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976).
4. United States courts have traditionally taken jurisdiction over foreign conduct which
has an effect on United States competition. See infra notes 39-88 and accompanying text. The
"effects" doctrine has been frequently criticized by writers on public international law. See,
e.g., F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-94 (1973); Jennings, General Course on
Principles of International Law, 121 RECUEIL DES CouRs 323, 519-20 (1967); Verzijl, The
Controversy Regarding the So-Called Extraterritorial Effect of the American Antitrust Laws,
8 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 3 (1961).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc. 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (United States antitrust efforts were directed at Swiss government supported
arrangements that maintained Swiss dominance of the world watch market); In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (the
agreement in question was supported by numerous foreign governments in order to preserve
domestic uranium production following the 1964 United States uranium purchasing em-
bargo).
6. For a sampling of government protests against United States antitrust enforcement
actions see INT'L L. ASS'N, 1964 REPORr OF THE FiFTr-FmRST CONFERENCE 565-88 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as ILA FimrY-FIRsT CONF. REP.].
7. See, e.g., Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl.
Acts 1125, amended by 1976 Austl. Acts 1743; Uranium Information Security Regulations,
1978 CAN. CONS. RFcs. ch. 366; Law of July 16, 1980, 1980 Journal Officiel de la Rpub-
lique Frangaise 1799, 1980 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Ligislation 285; Protection of Trading
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As a consequence of these foreign objections, United States
courts have recently been developing jurisdictional principles that
include an evaluation of foreign interests.8 Whether or not these
principles succeed at reducing international friction, it is significant
that United States courts are reexamining the legal theories on
which they base jurisdiction in international antitrust matters. As
more nations enforce their antitrust laws in cases having a foreign
element, the potential for international conflict increases. Only by
adopting more precise and generally accepted jurisdictional princi-
ples can antitrust enforcement be conducted harmoniously in the
international sphere.9
Of great interest in this context is a proceeding by the Commis-
sion of the European Communities 10 against International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM)." The Commission has alleged that
Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (U.K.). For a discussion of United States antitrust enforcement
efforts abroad and of foreign "blocking" statutes, see Note, Compelling Production of Docu-
ments in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the American
Position, 50 FoRDHAM L. REv. 877 (1982). For a discussion of the British "blocking" statute,
see Note, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980-Britain's Latest Weapon in the
Fight Against United States Antitrust Laws, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 341 (1980-81).
8. See infra notes 89-122 and accompanying text.
9. The call for a convention on international antitrust jurisdictional principles has
frequently been voiced. See, e.g., Timberg, An International Antitrust Convention: A Pro-
posal to Harmonize Conflicting National Policies Towards the Multi-National Corporation, 8
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 157 (1973).
10. The EEC's competition rules are contained in Articles 85-90 of the Treaty of Rome.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(unofficial English translation), 1973 Cr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Part II) (Cmd. 5179-II) (official
English version). The Commission of the European Communities may investigate and termi-
nate infringements of Articles 85 and 86. Regulation 17, art. 3, 5 J.O. COMM. EUm. 204, 205-
06, 1 COMMON Mrr. REP. (CCH) 2401, 2422 (Feb. 6, 1962). The Commission may fine
"undertakings" for violations of Articles 85 and 86. Id. art. 15. Decisions by the Commission
may be appealed to the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Court may
cancel, reduce or increase fines imposed by the Commission. Id. art. 17.
11. The case against International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) has been
discussed in an order and in an opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
Following receipt of the Commission's Statement of Objections dated December 19, 1980,
IBM sought an injunction on the Commission's proceedings and a declaration that the
Statement of Objections was invalid. The Court of Justice denied the injunction on the
grounds that IBM had failed to show "serious and irreversible harm." IBM v. Commission of
the Eur. Communities, - E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 93, 99
(1981)(order denying preliminary injunction). The request that the Court of Justice find the
Statement of Objections improper was rejected as premature. The Court held that it could
not review the Commission's actions until the Commission had issued a formal decision. IBM
v. Commission of the Eur. Communities, - E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 32 Common Mkt.
L.R. 635, 662 (1981).
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IBM violated Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome' 2 by abusing its
"dominant position" in European computer markets.1 3  IBM has
challenged the Commission's jurisdiction over the case based on
principles of international law.14  IBM argues that the Commission
may not exercise jurisdiction in this case because the allegedly
unlawful conduct was pursued primarily outside of the European
Economic Community (EEC) and in the United States.' 5
IBM has, in the terminology of international law, questioned
the EEC's legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is
an aspect of sovereignty and relates to the power to make binding
decisions or rules.' 6  Prescriptive jurisdiction is distinguished from
12. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 48-49 (unofficial English translation). The official English version of Article 86
reads as follows:
ARTICLE 86
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particu-
lar, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Part II) (Cmd. 5179-I).
For an analysis of Article 86, see Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in
European Community Antitrust Law, 3 FORDHAM INT'L FORUM 1 (1979-80).
13. The Commission has asserted that IBM has a dominant position in the EEC's
computer market, particularly in the market for software compatible with the IBM 360 and
370 computer systems. IBM has allegedly abused its dominant position to the detriment of
"plug compatible" manufacturers who sell products specifically designed to be compatible
with IBM's computers. IBM's alleged abuses consist in: (1) selling its software along with its
hardware without offering the products for separate sale ("bundling"); (2) refusing to predis-
close changes in the interface, the link between hardware and software, until the first
customer shipment has been made; and (3) refusing to sell valuable software unless that
software is used with an IBM control processing unit. __ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 32
Common Mkt. L.R. 635, 637 (1981).
14. __ E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 635, 638-39 (1981).
15. Id.
16. I. BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (3d ed. 1979),
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enforcement jurisdiction which is defined as the power to take
actions to enforce validly prescribed rules or laws.17
IBM has argued that the Commission must accept what IBM
considers a principle of customary international law18 requiring
"[s]tates to refrain from adopting measures in application of their
competition law if such measures would affect the interests of a
foreign State to a substantial extent and if those interests outweigh
the interests of the State proposing to take the measures."' 9 Ac-
cording to IBM, the initiation and continuance of the Commission's
administrative procedures constitute acts which, without a prior
balancing of state interests, violate United States sovereignty and
the rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. 20
The balancing of state interests approach in international anti-
trust matters was developed and is gaining acceptance in the United
States.2 1 This approach is largely the result of numerous conflicts
stemming from the application of United States antitrust laws to
foreign conduct 2 2 but is also the product of a new view of interna-
tional jurisdiction. Increasing economic interdependence and the
rise of multinationals have, according to some commentators in the
United States, rendered traditional territorial limitations to juris-
diction obsolete.2 3  The argument that the balancing of state inter-
ests should replace territorial considerations as the appropriate test
17. Id. The American Law Institute has proposed a third type of jurisdiction, adjudica-
tory jurisdiction, which establishes minimum international standards for asserting personal
jurisdiction. The most recent draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States has also made a significant and probably controversial change in the traditional
distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction by including United States
antitrust discovery orders in the prescriptive category, terming such orders "a second exercise
of jurisdiction to prescribe." RESTATEMENT (REvisED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNrrm STATES § 413 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
18. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
19. - E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.-., 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 635, 643 (1981).
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 89-122 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 62-88 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws,
International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES CouRs 311,
324-25 (1979); see also Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982). The belief
that territorial principles are becoming anachronistic is also reflected in the new draft
Restatement: "Inevitably, the rules themselves have changed, reflecting transformations in
global communications, in the level and variety of transnational activity, and in perceptions
of the way states interact with one another." RESTATEMENT (REvIsED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 92 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (footnote omitted).
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for jurisdiction has long been made in the United States. 24  Similar
views have been cautiously advanced by some European commen-
tators. 5
Accepting such a balancing of state interests approach in the
IBM case would involve changing the EEC's methods of evaluating
its jurisdiction over conduct abroad. 26  Whether such a change is
desirable remains an open question; resolving it requires examining
the principle as it evolved in the United States, the EEC's current
practice in such matters and the pertinent rules of international
law.
I. UNITED STATES PRACTICE AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NEW JURISDICTIONAL RULES
The Sherman2 7 and Clayton 28 Acts create three types of
actions for violations of federal antitrust laws. Two are the preroga-
tive of the federal government: the government may bring a crimi-
nal action, possibly resulting in fines or imprisonment,29 or may
bring a civil action aimed at enjoining or otherwise preventing the
antitrust infringements. 30  The Clayton Act creates a third action
for persons injured by antitrust violations and contemplates a recov-
ery three times the value of the injury sustained plus reasonable
attorney's fees. 31  The Sherman and Clayton Acts criminalize anti-
trust infringements and the primary purpose of the civil actions is
that of added enforcement. 32
24. See K. BRawsTmn, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 301-08, 309 app.
(1958).
25. See F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1973); I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 16, at 298.
26. See infra notes 89-122 and accompanying text.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
32. "The purpose of relief in [a government civil antitrust action] is 'so far as practica-
ble, [to] cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public freedom from its
continuance."' United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 64 (1973) (citing United
States v. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88 (1950)). See also United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226
U.S. 470, 476-77 (1913) (object of government civil actions is to decree the end of unlawful
combinations and conspiracies). Individuals bringing treble damage suits are frequently
referred to as "private attorney generals." While the private action is also designed to
compensate victims of antitrust violations, the legislative purpose in creating a treble damage
19821
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Although they may be enforced by civil actions, the antitrust
laws are not private but public in nature. 33  The distinction be-
tween private and public law is important when a court is pre-
sented with a claim having a foreign element. In matters of private
law, such as tort, the existence of foreign conduct may result in the
application of a foreign law. 34  The application of public laws to
action was to provide extra enforcement of the antitrust laws. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
33. Private Law:
As used in contradistinction to public law, the term means all that part of the law
which is administered between citizen and citizen, or which is concerned with the
definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in
whom the right inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is incident are
private individuals.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
Public Law:
That branch or department of law which is concerned with the state in its political
or sovereign capacity, including constitutional and administrative law, and with the
definition, regulation, and enforcement of rights in cases where the state is regarded
as the subject of the right or object of the duty,-including criminal law and
criminal procedure ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106-07 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
It is generally accepted that even civil antitrust actions serve to enforce public laws and
that their jurisdictional scope is limited, as are criminal cases, by territorial principles. See I.
BROWNUE, supra note 16, at 300-01; D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 821 (2d ed.
1970); J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 271-72 (8th ed. 1977); Jen-
nings, Extraterritorial jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 146, 147-48 (1957); Verzijl, The Controversy Regarding the So-Called Extraterritorial
Effect of the American Antitrust Laws, 8 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 3, 4 (1961). But cf. Akehurst,
Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 190-92 (1972-73) (makes
exception for treble damage actions).
34. The rules of conflict of laws provide means for ascertaining applicable law and
resolving conflicts. "The world is composed of territorial states having separate and differing
systems of law. Events and transactions occur, and issues arise, that may have a significant
relationship to more than one state, making necessary a special body of rules and methods for
their ordering and resolution." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
Some of the principles used in determining applicable law are listed in § 6 of the Restatement.
Id. § 6. Conflict of laws rules are generally inapplicable to criminal matters. Id. § 2 comment
c. Criminal law is an area
in which jurisdictional notions have performed most of the work elsewhere left to
choice-of-law rules. The crucial determination in the application of criminal laws is
whether the court has jurisdiction; if it has, it applies its own criminal law.
Although this does not exclude interpretive problems of the territorial scope of
criminal law (e.g., did the legislature intend to prohibit acts done elsewhere?)
which resemble choice-of-law questions, the court does not concern itself with the
distinct question whether it should apply foreign law.
R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 52 (3d
ed. 1981).
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foreign conduct, however, raises the issue whether the enforcing
nation has the power to extend its laws beyond its territory. 3
In United States antitrust jurisprudence, questions of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction are incorporated in the analysis of subject matter
jurisdiction.36 When all or part of the conduct alleged to violate
the Sherman or Clayton Acts takes place outside of the United
States, the issue becomes whether the Acts can reach such foreign
conduct. 37  Whether United States antitrust laws can apply to
conduct abroad is a matter of congressional intent and of interna-
tional law. 38
A. Genesis of the "Effects" Doctrine
In the first Supreme Court antitrust case involving foreign
conduct, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,3' a New Jersey
corporation allegedly engaged in conduct, with the aid of govern-
ment officials in Panama and Costa Rica, designed to close plain-
tiff's Panamanian banana plantation, thereby eliminating plaintiff
as a competitor in the United States market. 40  Justice Holmes
dismissed the case, expressing his surprise at the argument that the
Sherman Act should apply to conduct outside of the United States. 4'
35. The application of a nation's public laws beyond its borders is limited by interna-
tional law. International law posits the existence of states having the right to be the almost
exclusive source of public law within their territories. The extension of one nation's public
laws into the territory of another will violate international law unless it conforms to accepted
international practices. See infra notes 168-95 and accompanying text. This is recognized by
authorities on conflict of laws:
Internationally, independent sovereigns may look upon crime as in substantial
measure an offense against the political sovereign rather than as an occasion for
corrective treatment of wrongdoers and protection of the public generally from
antisocial acts. This premise is reflected in the procedural situation; the state moves
as one injured party to protect its own interests. The moving state may not wish to
entrust the vindication of its interests to courts of another sovereign; by the same
token, the other sovereign may feel the inappropriateness and potential embarrass-
ment of opening its courts to foreign penal actions.
A. VON MsEHEN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 793 (1965).
36. See infra notes 39-122 and accompanying text.
37. The fact that subject matter jurisdiction is at issue in cases involving foreign conduct
is a recognition of the public nature of all types of United States antitrust actions. See infra
notes 39-122 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 39-61 and accompanying text.
39. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
40. Id. at 354-55.
41. Id. at 355.
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He believed that such an assertion of jurisdiction "would be an
interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to
the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might
resent. ' 42  Furthermore, Holmes found no evidence of a legislative
intent to reach conduct outside of the United States and concluded
that "what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within
the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned." 43
Justice Holmes admitted only three exceptions to this rather
strict territorial view of legislative jurisdiction. He stated that na-
tions were permitted to prescribe laws regulating foreign conduct
by their nationals, piracy on the high seas, and conduct engaged in
abroad by foreigners affecting important national interests or gov-
ernmental processes. 44
The jurisdictional statements in American Banana have subse-
quently been ignored, distinguished or reinterpreted in antitrust
cases. In United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation45
defendants were indicted for combining and conspiring to eliminate
competition in the business of transportation of freight and passen-
gers between various ports in the United States and areas in Alaska
and British Columbia. 4  When defendants argued that the Sher-
man Act could not apply to conduct which had taken place in
British Columbia, the Court retorted that "to apply the proposition
as defendants apply it would put the transportation route described
in the indictment out of the control of either Canada or the United
States. These consequences we cannot accept."-4 7
The Supreme Court distinguished American Banana in United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp. ,4 in which defendants were charged
with conspiring to restrain the importation and sale of sisal from
Mexico into the United States. 49  Defendants allegedly formed a
Mexican corporation, whose purpose was to be the sole purchaser of
sisal from Mexican producers, and the Sisal Sales Co., whose pur-
42. Id. at 356 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 357.
44. Id. at 356. These categories are recognized as valid bases for prescriptive jurisdiction
under international law. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
45. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
46. Id. at 88-89.
47. Id. at 106. The result here is probably consistent with the objective territorial
principle discussed infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
48. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
49. Id. at 271-72.
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pose was to be the sole sisal importer in the United States. Justice
McReynolds found that since the restraints involved conduct within
the United States, rather than exclusively foreign conduct, as in
American Banana, the Court had proper jurisdiction. 0
While the Court in Sisal Sales distinguished American Banana
on the basis that part of the relevant conduct occurred within the
United States, the Second Circuit stated a much broader proposi-
tion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America51 (Alcoa). The
federal government brought a civil action charging Alcoa and sixty-
two other defendants with monopolization of interstate and foreign
commerce in the manufacture and sale of "virgin" aluminum in-
got. 52 The circuit court held that Aluminum "Limited," a Cana-
dian aluminum producer with which Alcoa shared stockholders and
directors, was part of a wider cartel called "Alliance." 5 3 "Alli-
ance," a Swiss corporation, had been formed following a 1931
agreement among French, German, Swiss and British corporations
in addition to "Limited." 54 The purpose of the 1931 agreement,
and of a subsequent agreement in 1936, was to fix the proportion of
world sales that each had achieved in 1931 and to reduce competi-
tion for world market share among them.5 5 Although the agree-
ment did not include provisions as to imports into the United States,
"when that question arose during its preparation, as it did, all the
shareholders agreed that such imports should be included in the
quotas." 5 16
In deciding whether the cartel came within the reach of the
Sherman Act, Judge Hand inferred congressional intent to reach the
cartel. He did so when he stated that the laws of the United States
extend up to the point that they reach "the limitations customarily
observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers." 57 Distin-
guishing American Banana as a case in which the conduct had no
consequences within the United States, 58 Judge Hand stated that
50. Id. at 276. The result here is also probably consistent with the objective territorial
principle discussed infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
51. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. Id. at 421.
53. Id. at 441.
54. Id. at 442.
55. Id. at 441-43.
56. Id. at 443.
57. Id.
58. Id. This statement seems inconsistent with the facts in American Banana. Defend-
ant's actions most definitely had an effect on American competition because defendant's
1982]
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"it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its bor-
ders that has consequences within its borders which the state repre-
hends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." 59
Judge Hand then went on to formulate what has come to be
known as the "effects" test. Citing Pacific & Arctic Railway and
Sisal Sales, he stated that the Sherman Act would apply to any
conduct as long as that conduct was intended to have and actually
had an effect on United States exports or imports.60
alleged conduct was undertaken in order to eliminate plaintiff as a competitor in United
States banana markets.
59. Id. (citations omitted). Judge Hand based this proposition on three cases. In the first
case, Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911), the defendant was indicted in Michigan on
charges of bribing a public official and obtaining public money under false pretenses.
Without setting foot in Michigan until after the crime, the defendant entered into a contract
with a Michigan State prison and bribed the warden to accept used equipment rather than
contractually promised new machinery. Michigan authorities discovered the scheme, con-
victed the warden and asked the State of Illinois to extradite the defendant. The Illinois
District Judge issued a writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the defendant had not commit-
ted a crime in Michigan and could not, therefore, be extradited. Justice Holmes reversed,
stating that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had
been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power." 221
U.S. at 285 (citations omitted). On its face this appears to be a formulation of the "protective
principle" because the criminal conduct took place entirely outside of Michigan and the case
involved bribery of a public official. For a discussion of the "protective principle," see infta
notes 184-88 and accompanying text. The case is, however, interpreted as an exercise of
jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle because the fraud was committed in
Michigan by defendant's agent, thereby permitting the court to impute the agent's conduct to
defendant. See generally Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21:
Overextension of the Protective Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REv.
688 (1982).
A different notion was used in the second case, Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60
(1916). In Lamar the defendant committed fraud by impersonating a United States Congress-
man in a telephone conversation with a person in New York. Justice Holmes held that "[t]he
personation was by telephone to a person in New York (Southern District) and it might be
found that the speaker also was in the Southern District; but if not, at all events the
personation took effect there." Id. at 65-66 (citation omitted). The last case cited by Judge
Hand was Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). The defendants in Ford were convicted
of conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The Court found that some defendants
smuggled alcoholic substances into the United States from a boat outside United States
territorial waters. The fact that some defendants remained outside the United States at all
times did not bar prosecution, according to the Court, because all were part of a conspiracy
to violate United States laws and overt acts by certain members took place within the United
States. Id. at 620-21. Because conduct occurred partly inside and partly outside the United
States this case can be categorized among cases employing the objective territorial principle.
See supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
60. 148 F.2d at 444.
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While Alcoa continued the earlier trend of expanding United
States jurisdiction in antitrust matters, it marked a radical depar-
ture from the analysis used in prior cases. American Banana, Pa-
cific & Arctic Railway, and Sisal Sales all concentrated on the
location of the conduct in order to decide whether United States
law was applicable. Alcoa shifted the focus from the location of the
conduct to the location of the effect. Although Judge Hand believed
that "other states will ordinarily recognize"61 court judgments
based on this principle, subsequent history of the "effects" doctrine
suggests otherwise.
B. The "Effects" Doctrine Under Fire
During the 1940's and 1950's the United States government
targeted a number of international combinations whose purpose
was to divide the world into zones dominated by particular cartel
members.6 2  By bringing these cases, the Department of Justice
incurred the wrath of numerous foreign governments which per-
ceived the American antitrust enforcement actions as violations of
their sovereignty.
In United States v. National Lead Co.,63 the Justice Depart-
ment successfully challenged a cartel comprising the National Lead
Company, DuPont, and other titanium pigment and compounds
manufacturers in Britain, Germany, France, Canada, Japan and
Italy. 4 Addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the
district court confidently asserted that "[n]o citation of authority is
any longer necessary to support the proposition that a combination
of competitors, which by agreement divides the world into exclu-
sive trade areas, and suppresses all competition among the members
of the combination, offends the Sherman Act." 6 5
61. Id. at 443.
62. These are known as the international cartel cases and include: United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. National Lead Co., 63
F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afJ'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. General Elec. Co.,
82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953); United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), decree, 105 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
63. 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
64. Id. at 533.
65. Id. at 523.
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A similar case causing greater international controversy,
United States v. General Electric Co. ,6e involved General Electric,
Philips (of Holland), and a number of companies from various
countries including Britain, France, Italy, Hungary, Japan and
Mexico. 67  Philips was charged with unlawfully restraining the
importation to and exportation from the United States of incandes-
cent electric lamps and machinery, and conspiring with General
Electric to help the latter maintain its monopoly position in the
United States market for incandescent electric lamps.6 8 Philips ar-
gued that because the agreements were not unlawful in Holland,
and because Philips had simply agreed not to compete in the United
States, its conduct was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. 69
The court found the Alcoa intent requirement satisfied by the
fact that Philips knew or should have known of the Sherman Act
and of the effect that its agreement with General Electric had on
competition in the United States.7 0 The court then found deleteri-
ous effects on competition in the United States because Philips
agreed to refrain from using its United States patents and "lent itself
to the General Electric plan of throttling potential sources of for-
eign lamp parts." 71  The court's decree resulted in a diplomatic
protest against what the Dutch government considered a violation
of international law and of its sovereign rights, because, in its view,
the United States had assigned itself the right to prohibit certain
kinds of conduct on Dutch soil. 72
The view that United States courts had exceeded their jurisdic-
tion was reiterated by British courts following the decree in United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries.73  A district court judge
found that through the conclusion of numerous agreements among
United States and foreign manufacturers of chemicals and explo-
sives, an international cartel had been created to divide the world
into separate competition zones.7 4 The principal defendants were
66. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
67. Id. at 828.
68. Id. at 884.
69. Id. at 890.
70. Id. at 891.
71. Id.
72. Netherlands government protest against proposed decree in General Electric case
(May 3, 1951), reprinted in L. EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS: CASES, COMMENTS AND MATERIALS 571-73 (1964).
73. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), decree, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
74. 105 F. Supp. at 220.
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DuPont and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a British corpora-
tion. Having found that the purposes of the cartel had been fur-
thered by an exchange of patents between ICI and DuPont in 1946,
the district court ordered the cancellation of the agreement and
required that certain British nylon patents held by ICI be recon-
veyed to DuPont with the provision that a new agreement could be
executed if it granted a non-exclusive license that provided for
royalty payments and removed all contractual barriers to exporta-
tion . 7 5
When the district court judge issued this decree, he was aware
that ICI had granted irrevocable and exclusive rights to make yarn
and nylon polymer to British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. (BNS), a British
company in which ICI had a 50 % stock interest. Following the
judge's order that ICI transfer its British patents back to DuPont,
BNS brought a suit in England to enjoin ICI from doing so and
asked for a decree of specific performance on the agreement be-
tween ICI and BNS. 78  The British court was presented with a
United States court order that required a British corporation to
break a contract regarding British patents made in England with a
second British corporation. Judge Evershed, of the Court of Ap-
peals, found that
in this case there is raised a somewhat serious question whether
the order, in the form that it takes, does not assert an extra-
territorial jurisdiction which the courts of this country cannot
recognise, notwithstanding any such comity. Applied con-
versely, I conceive that the American courts would likewise be
slow (to say the least) to recognise an assertion on the part of the
British courts of jurisdiction extending, in effect, to the business
affairs of persons and corporations in the United States.77
The reach of United States enforcement efforts was also the
object of Swiss protests following United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc.78  Unlike the international
75. Id. at 231-32.
76. The injunction was granted in British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A). The decree for specific performance was granted in
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. [1954] 3 All E.R. 88 (Ch.).
77. [1952] 2 All E.R. at 782. While the American court order (an exercise of enforce-
ment jurisdiction) sparked the controversy, Judge Evershed's statement seems to apply, at
least in part, to prescriptive jurisdiction as well.
78. 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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cartel cases, which involved corporations from many different na-
tions, all the defendants and most of the co-conspirators in Swiss
Watchmakers were from either the United States or Switzerland. 79
The primary object of a 1931 convention comprising Swiss watch
manufacturers and some of their subsidiaries in the United States
was to maintain and bolster Swiss dominance of the world watch
trade.80 With the active support of the Swiss government,8' Swiss
watchmakers agreed to manufacture watches only in Switzerland,
to refuse to export watchmaking machinery or watch parts, and
otherwise regulate the sale and export of watches from Switzer-
land.812 The court described various attempts by Swiss watchmak-
ers to enforce the terms of the convention on subsidiaries in the
United States and a number of episodes in which Swiss watchmak-
ers refused to sell watch parts and watchmaking equipment to
United States watchmakers.8 3
The district court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction
because the Swiss restrictions on United States imports had a "sub-
stantial and material effect" on United States commerce. 84  It
found that while the Swiss government had supported the conduct
of Swiss watchmakers, it had not actually required such conduct
and that, therefore, no issue relating to foreign compulsion or
sovereignty was involved.85  This was done notwithstanding the
submission of a Swiss amicus curiae brief declaring that
[n]ot only does the present action constitute a direct attack upon
the legislation and policy of the Swiss Confederation; it further
seeks to regulate conditions in Switzerland and to limit the
control which the Swiss Confederation may exercise over its own
watch industry. Surely, the anti-trust laws should not be applied
in such a way and these laws cannot be so applied. It has always
79. 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 77,416.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 77,428-32. The Court outlined Swiss legislation enacted between 1931 and
1954 designed to stabilize prices and regulate the export of watchmaking machinery. Id. The
Court found that at least some of the legislation was adopted by request of Swiss watchmak-
ing organizations. Id. at 77,428.
82. Id. at 77,426.
83. Id. at 77,432-35.
84. Id. at 77,457.
85. Id. at 77,456-57. Compulsion by a foreign government may provide a defense in
United States antitrust actions. See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTER-
NATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 148-69 (1979).
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been held that the anti-trust laws do not apply to acts done in
the territory of a foreign sovereign in furtherance of that sover-
eign's law and policy .... 86
In spite of these protests, Judge Cashin issued a decree that required
extensive changes in Swiss watch marketing practices. 87  Although
modified as a result of pressure from the State Department, the
final decree still ordered Swiss watchmakers to abandon the 1931
convention as well as all practices that restrained Swiss exports to
the United States. 88
C. Towards a Solution?
The fact that numerous Europeans protested the far reach of
United States judicial actions did not go unnoticed in the United
States. 9 As early as 1958, Kingman Brewster proposed a more
flexible approach to the exercise of United States jurisdiction in
antitrust matters that would incorporate an evaluation of any for-
eign interests involved. 0 The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States uses a similar type of analysis
requiring a balancing of state interests as a limitation on enforce-
ment jurisdiction."' This approach was explicitly derived from
86. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Swiss Confederation, extracted in ILA FIrTY-FIRST
CONF. REP., supra note 6, at 575.
87. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., No. Civ. 96-170
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1964).
88. 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For a comparison of the two
decrees, see INT'L L. ASS'N, 1966 REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 67-74 (1967).
89. Ignoring the protests would have been difficult. For a compilation of official
protests, see ILA FiFrY-FIRsT CONF. REP., supra note 6, at 562-88.
90. Brewster's approach is frequently referred to as a "jurisdictional rule of reason." See
K. BREwsTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINESS ABROAD 301-08 (1958).
91.
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct on the part of a person, each
state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the
exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
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conflict of laws principles and adopted in view of the protests
against the overextension of United States judicial measures abroad.
To the reporter of section 40:
The parallel between conflict of laws doctrine and the present
Section is clear. In both cases the question is not one of lack of
jurisdiction but of the desirability of exercising power in a hard-
ship situation (from the standpoint of the person concerned) or
of international difficulty or tension (from the standpoint of the
states concerned). 92
Regarding prescriptive jurisdiction, however, the second Restate-
ment adopts the traditional bases for jurisdiction in international
matters 3 and includes the "effects" doctrine among territorial prin-
ciples. 4
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
(hereinafter cited as FOR. RELS. LAW]. Disagreement exists as to what constitutes enforce-
ment. Most American commentators would probably agree that the police of one nation
cannot unilaterally decide to conduct operations on foreign soil. Cf. id. § 44 (discusses limits
to enforcement actions in foreign territory). In common law countries in personam discovery
orders would certainly not be compared to police actions (the revised Restatement doesn't
even consider them enforcement actions, see supra note 17) but the opposite view apparently
predominates in Europe.
It is indisputable that the American court could not make a discovery order and
have it executed abroad. This would be the exercise of police power in the territory
of another State. The indirect way to accomplish its purposes is to issue such an
order and oblige an enterprise before the court to go abroad and produce documents
located there. This is nothing but an attempt to achieve indirectly what would be
contrary to international law if attempted directly.
Riedweg, The Extra-territorial Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation-Jurisdiction and
International Law, ILA FiFr-FmsT CONF. REP., supra note 6, 357, at 403.
92. FOR. RFm. LAW, supra note 91, § 40 reporters' note 2.
93. Id. § 10. Section 10 sets out territory, nationality, the protection of certain state
interests and the protection of certain universal interests as bases for jurisdiction. Id.
94. Section 18 of the second Restatement reads:
Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect within Territory
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements
of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal
systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that
have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id. § 18.
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The jurisdictional principles developed by the second Restate-
ment in 1965 were not immediately accepted by United States
courts.95 A number of courts limited their analysis of jurisdiction
to the "effects" doctrine and focused on whether a substantial or
direct effect existed in a given case.96 Other courts began moving
toward Restatement and conflict of laws concepts but altered the
second Restatement principles in doing so. 97  The Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia announced a radical test for jurisdiction in
international antitrust cases: "surely the test which determines
whether United States law is applicable must focus on the nexus
between the parties and their practices and the United States, not
on the mechanical circumstances of effect on commodity exports or
imports."98
In a holding that revolutionized the analysis of subject matter
jurisdiction in antitrust questions, the Ninth Circuit formulated a
The European Advisory Committee on the Draft Restatement Relating to Jurisdiction
questioned the categorization of the "effects" doctrine as territorial. It seemed clear to the
Committee that any doctrine permitting the assertion of jurisdiction to conduct entirely
outside that nation could not possibly be called territorial. This was so because territorial
nations traditionally required all or at least part of the proscribed conduct to take place
within the territory of the nation asserting jurisdiction. The fact that the conduct in question
might affect the territory could not provide an adequate basis for jurisdiction under the
territorial principle. Excerpts from the Report of the European Advisory Committee on the
Draft Restatement Relating to Jurisdiction, in ILA Fir=-FIasr CONF. REP. supra note 6, at
537-43.
95. This was partially so because Swiss Watchmakers marked the end of vigorous
Department of Justice enforcement of antitrust laws in the international sphere. Even after
Restatement principles were adopted, however, courts modified the analysis by calling for a
balancing of interests when examining prescriptive as well as enforcement jurisdiction. The
Restatement Second would permit a United States court to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction
over foreign conduct, assuming an effect in the United States. In such a situation, according
to the Restatement Second, both the United States and a foreign country would have
prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct in question: the United States would have jurisdic-
tion by way of the "effects" doctrine, while the foreign country would have jurisdiction by
way of the territorial principle. In the absence of foreign requirements to the contrary, the
United States court would be free to engage in enforcement action, including discovery orders
and final decrees requiring conduct abroad. In the event that foreign laws forbid the actions
ordered by a United States court, the Restatement requires that the United States court
balance the factors in § 40, so as to decide what weight to give that foreign law.
96. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331,F. Supp. 92
(C.D. Cal. 1971), affd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
950 (1972).
97. Joseph Muller Corp., Zurich v. Societ6 Anonyme de Gerance et D'Armement, 451
F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific
Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
98. 404 F.2d at 815.
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new test for establishing the limits of the Sherman Act in 1976. The
court, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,99 discussed
the conflicts engendered by use of the "effects" doctrine and cited
some of its foreign critics. 00 The court found the doctrine lacking
in that it failed to consider the interests of other nations or to take
into account the relationship between the parties and the prescrib-
ing nation.' 0' The court explicitly sought to adopt a conflict of
laws approach in the analysis of international jurisdiction in order
to develop, in Brewster's words, a "jurisdictional rule of reason.'10 2
The court established a three step analysis to determine if a
United States court has subject matter jurisdiction. A court must
ask itself: (1) whether the alleged restraint affects or is intended to
affect the foreign commerce of the United States; (2) whether the
restraint is of a type and magnitude as to be cognizable as a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act; and (3) whether as a matter of interna-
tional comity and fairness, the United States court should exercise
its jurisdiction. 03  The third tier can be answered only by balanc-
ing a set of factors similar to those set out in section 40 of the second
Restatement.' 0 4  The balancing process, previously relevant only to
enforcement jurisdiction, has now become essential in the .analysis
of prescriptive jurisdiction.
With slight modifications, the Timberlane test has been
adopted by the Third Circuit. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congo-
99. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
100. Id. at 610.
101. Id. at 611-12.
102. Id. at 613 (citing K. BREwsTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446
(1958)).
103. Id. at 615.
104.
[T]he elements to be weighed include
[(I)] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
[(2)] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations,
[(3)] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance,
[(4)] the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere,
[(5)] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce,
[(6)] the foreseeability of such effect, and
[(7)] the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614. Compare supra note 94 (second Restatement factors).
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leum Corp. ,105 an appeal from a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court found that the plaintiff had sufficiently al-
leged an antitrust violation affecting United States foreign com-
merce.106 The court thus concluded it had proper subject matter
jurisdiction and proceeded to the balancing stage, not to decide
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction, but only to resolve
whether it should exercise jurisdiction.10 7  Slightly different factors
were used in the balancing process than those presented in Tim-
berlane, but the analysis remained essentially the same. 108
The Timberlane approach is not only being accepted by more
courts'0 9 but may well be adopted by the American Law Institute in
a forthcoming edition of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States." 0 Section 402 of the current draft includes
the-previously listed bases for prescriptive jurisdiction, including
the "effects" doctrine,"' but requires the use of a balancing ap-
proach to temper the exercise of jurisdiction in all cases having a
105. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 1292.
107. Id. at 1294.
108. The factors to be considered include:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its forseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98 (footnote omitted).
109. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,288 (E.D. Pa.); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp.
680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 63,836 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Timberlane approach in favor of the
"effects" doctrine).
110. RESTATEMENT (REvisED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981).
111. Id. § 402(1)(c).
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foreign element. 12  The American Law Institute, following Tim-
berlane's lead, thus appears to be moving away from the position of
the second Restatement which required the use of a balancing test
only at the enforcement stage.
The draft Restatement includes a special section illustrating
the application of United States antitrust laws within the frame-
work provided by the preceding sections on prescriptive jurisdic-
tion." 3  This section appears to retreat from the requirement that a
balancing of factors is necessary any time foreign conduct is in-
volved. Apparently, use of the "effects" doctrine is presumptively
reasonable when the principal purpose of foreign conduct is to
affect United States commerce and it actually has such an effect. " 4
The balancing test is only required "with respect to any other
agreement or conduct in restraint of United States trade if such
agreement or conduct has substantial effect on the commerce of the
United States.''1
The basic purpose of the Timberlane and draft Restatement
approaches, that of eliminating or at least reducing international
conflict, has not yet been achieved. In re Uranium Antitrust Litiga-
112. Id. § 403(2). This section reads:
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by evaluating all
the relevant factors, including:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state,
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the persons principally responsible for the activity to be regu-
lated, or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation in question;
(e) the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or eco-
nomic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id.
113. Id. § 415.
114. Id. § 415(2).
115. Id. § 415(3).
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tion" 6 (Uranium) not only suggests that United States courts may
not be equipped to evaluate foreign interests, 1 7 but that the era of
international protests over the application of United States laws to
foreign conduct has yet to end.
In 1976, Westinghouse initiated Uranium by suing seventeen
domestic and twelve foreign corporations claiming that they had
participated in an arrangement to fix world uranium prices." 8
Following the default of nine of the foreign defendants, the govern-
ments of Australia, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom
each filed amicus curiae briefs with the Seventh Circuit challenging
the court's jurisdiction."' In language reminiscent of the protests
surrounding Swiss Watchmakers, the Canadian government stated
in its brief that it "considered it contrary to her sovereign preroga-
tives for foreign tribunals to question the propriety or legality of the
actions of Canadian uranium producers that were taken outside the
United States and were required by Canadian law or taken in
implementation of Canadian government policy." 2 0 The Seventh
Circuit found, notwithstanding the fact that the district court judge
never so much as mentioned Timberlane, that the district court had
not "abused its discretion" in proceeding with the case and thereby
116. 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979), alf'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
117. This was recognized by Judge Marshall in the Uranium case. In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979). See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES,
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 44 (Supp. 1980);
Jacobs, Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws: An English View, 13 INT'L LAW.
645, 651 (1979).
118. 473 F. Supp. at 384-85. The history of the uranium litigation is quite complex and
no court has yet set out comprehensive findings of fact. It appears that in response to a United
States uranium import ban, a number of uranium producing countries encouraged uranium
producers to stabilize the price of uranium. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Can., Ltd., 111 D.L.R.3d
74, 77 (Can. 1980). Uranium prices increased from $6 per pound in the 1960's to about $40
per pound in the late 1970's. Id. This increase led Westinghouse to breach a number of
uranium supply contracts it had with utility companies. Numerous utilities brought suit
against Westinghouse and thirteen actions were consolidated in the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig.,
405 F. Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). Westinghouse has asserted a defense of impracticability
and has argued that the sharp price increases are due to a uranium producer cartel. See
generally Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: Suit Litigation and Legal Implica-
tions, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 59, 64-87 (1979). Westinghouse then brought a separate suit in
Chicago against uranium producers. 473 F. Supp. 382.
119. 617 F.2d at 1253. The circuit court made only sparing reference to the objections
raised in the amicus briefs. Id. at 1253-56.
120. Canadian amicus brief, excerpted in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Can., Ltd., 111
D.L.R.3d 74, 87 (Can. 1980).
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complied with the analysis set forth in Timberlane.'21 When
United States courts later sought Canadian judicial cooperation for
discovery in Canada, the requests were flatly denied. 22
D. The Trend Towards Non-Territorial Principles of Jurisdiction
In the seven decades since American Banana, the United States
has inched away from territorial principles in matters of interna-
tional antitrust. Initially, United States courts required conduct
within the United States in order to distinguish American Banana,
but Alcoa opened the door to any case in which, even if all the
relevant conduct occurred abroad, an effect was felt within the
United States. Paradoxically, criticisms of the "effects" doctrine
have pushed United States courts even farther away from tradi-
tional territorial principles. The analysis in Timberlane and the
draft Restatement concentrates much more on the balancing of
interests than on the location of conduct or the location of effect.
Should the influence of conflict of laws principles continue, even
the "effects" doctrine could eventually be abandoned in favor of a
pure conflict of laws interest analysis.12 3
II. PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome 2 4 are the most
important provisions of the EEC's competition law. 1 25  Each article
contains jurisdictional requirements that differentiate antitrust vio-
lations that take place entirely within one EEC member state from
those that involve trade between EEC countries.12 6  Article 85 is
121. 617 F.2d at 1255-56.
122. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Can., Ltd., 111 D.L.R.3d 74 (Can. 1980). Canadian
and British courts previously rejected discovery requests stemming from the Virginia action.
See Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 D.L.R.3d 3 (Ont. H. Ct. J. 1977); Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L.). See generally Note,
Potential Havens from American Jurisdiction and Discovery Laws in International Antitrust
EnJorcement, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 240, 256-66 (1981) (discusses Canadian and British reac-
tions to the Uranium litigation).
123. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
124. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, arts.
85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-49 (unofficial English translation), 1973 Cr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Part II) (Cmd. 5179-I) (official English version).
125. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A
COMPARATIVE GUIDE 413 (1979).
126. The fact that an antitrust violation takes place completely within one EEC country
will not, however, necessarily preclude a Commission proceeding. See, e.g., Vereeniging van
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directed at agreements and concerted practices "which may affect
trade between the Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market."12 7  Article 86 prohibits any abuse by enter-
prises having a dominant position within the Common Market "in
so far as it may affect trade between Member States."'' 8  These
jurisdictional standards, by requiring an effect on trade between
EEC members, embody a type of "effects" test. 2  The EEC used
this jurisdictional standard even in cases in which conduct occurred
outside the EEC. From the very start, however, the EEC encoun-
tered resistance to such a broad jurisdictional test on the interna-
tional plane.
Following Commission proceedings in Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. 30
(Dyestuffs), six EEC, one British and three Swiss dyestuffs manu-
facturers were fined for violating Article 85. 13' The Commission
found a conspiracy to fix the price of dyestuffs sold within the
Common Market and declared that its decision would apply to all
defendants involved. 32  It rather boldly stated that as long as there
was an effect on EEC trade there was "no need to examine whether
the undertakings which are the cause of these restrictions of compe-
tition have their seat within or outside the Community.' ' 33  The
Commission decided, however, to notify the foreign defendants of
Cementhandelaren v. Commission des Communauts europ6enes, 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec.
977, 992, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 7, 22 (an agreement which was limited to the Netherlands
came within article 85 because it rendered penetration of Dutch markets more difficult).
127. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 85,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 (unofficial English translation), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Part II)
(Cmd. 5179-11) (official English version).
128. Id. art. 86. See supra note 12.
129. This "effect," however, is not what provides jurisdiction on an international level
but is what differentiates EEC jurisdiction from that of member states. The requirement that
the antitrust violation affect trade between member states is. similar to the Sherman Act
requirement that an antitrust violation restrain or monopolize "trade or commerce among the
several States." 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 443-54 (1979).
130. 12J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 195) 11,8 Common Mkt. L.R. D23 (1969), aJ'd, 1972
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 557.
131. 12 J.O, COMM. EuR. (No. L 195) at 17, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. at D34. The United
Kingdom was not yet part of the EEC in 1969. The other defendants were from Germany,
France, and Italy. Id.
132. 12 J.O. COMM. Eu. (No. L 195) at 16, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. at D33-34.
133. 12 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 195) at 16, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. at D33.
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its decision by communicating it to subsidiaries within the Common
Market completely controlled by the foreign parents.14
The British response was immediate. In an aide mimoire to
the Commission, the government of the United Kingdom expressed
its opinion that the EEC's apparent adoption of the "effects" doc-
trine conflicted with the principles of public international law. 35
It further commented that notification through a subsidiary was
also "open to objection" as a violation of the jurisdictional limits
imposed by international law. 36
British fears that the EEC was adopting the "effects" doctrine
were enhanced by a pronouncement on the matter by the Court of
Justice. Although no non-EEC company was a defendant in Be-
guelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, 37 the Court of
Justice stated that Article 85 was applicable to foreign defendants
and that "[t]he fact that one of the undertakings participating in
the agreement is situated in a non-member country is no obstacle to
the application of that provision, so long as the agreement produces
its effects in the territory of the Common Market."'' 38
The Court addressed the matter directly when Dyestuffs
reached it on appeal from the Commission. 39  In support of de-
fendant Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. (ICI), Professor Jen-
nings of the University of Cambridge wrote a brief contending that
application of EEC law to the defendant violated international law
because ICI had not engaged in conduct within the EEC. 40  The
Commission responded by arguing that conduct had taken place
within the EEC through ICI's subsidiaries.' 4' As an alternative
argument the Commission stated that its assertion of jurisdiction
was consonant with international law either through the "effects"
doctrine or the protective principle. 42  Avoiding arguments about
134. 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 195) at 17, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. at D35.
135. 1967 BRrT. PRAc. INT'L L. 58.
136. Id. at 59. Unfortunately this point was not developed in the aide m~moire.
137. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81.
138. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 959, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. at 95.
139. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Commission des Communaut~s europ~enes, 1972
C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 557.
140. 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 624-27, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) at 8004-07.
141. 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 627-30, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) at 8007-09.
142. Id. This is a rare instance of an argument favoring the expansion of antitrust
jurisdiction through use of the protective principle.
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international law, the Court accepted the Commission's position
that ICI had engaged in conduct in the EEC via its subsidiaries.'
43
Although recognizing that parent and subsidiary companies are
legally distinct entities, the Court imputed the subsidiary's conduct
to the parent, and thereby found conduct by the foreign parent
within the EEC.' 44
The Court of Justice faced a similar argument based on inter-
national law in Europemballage Corp. v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities.'45  Continental Can, a New York corporation,
formed Europemballage, a Delaware corporation with an office in
Brussels. The subsidiary engaged in various corporate acquisitions
in Europe and both parent and subsidiary were soon the object of
Article 86 proceedings by the Commission. Following a Commis-
sion holding against them,' 46 the defendants appealed to the Court
of Justice on numerous grounds including lack of jurisdiction under
international law. 1 7  The Court reversed the Commission's deci-
sion on other grounds, but found that the Commission had jurisdic-
tion over Continental Can because the subsidiary's acts could be
attributed to the parent. 48
In another case involving a defendant from the United States,
Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities,'49 the Court of Justice used a somewhat differ-
ent approach. Commercial Solvents, a Maryland corporation, pur-
chased an Italian chemicals manufacturer and both were
eventually charged with abuse of dominant position.' 50 Commer-
cial Solvents argued that the EEC had unlawfully exercised juris-
diction over its conduct in the United States.' 5 ' The Court re-
143. 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 665-67, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. at 628-30. In doing
so, the Court rejected the point of view presented by the Advocate General. The Advocate
General strongly favored adoption of the "effects" doctrine. 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 694-
703, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. at 593-608.
144. 1972 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. at 666, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. at 629.
145. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Common Mkt L.R. 199.
146. Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Europemballage Corp., 15 J.O. COMM.
Eua. (No. L 7) 25, 39, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. DlI, D35 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 1973
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199.
147. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 222, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
RE'. (CCH) at 8284.
148. 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 241-42, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. at 221-22.
149. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep 223, 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309.
150. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 226-27, 13 Common Mkt. L.R. at 312-14.
151. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 231-32, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) at 8806-07.
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sponded that the companies had engaged in "obviously united
action" and that for the purposes of this proceeding they "must be
deemed an economic unit and... are jointly and severally respon-
sible for the conduct complained of." 1 5.
The Commission has repeatedly used the "single economic
unit" approach in later cases. 153  It has become the established rule
in EEC proceedings involving conduct outside' the Community by
non-EEC corporations with subsidiaries within the EEC.15 4  What
remains unclear is whether the Court of Justice would adopt the
"effects" doctrine in the event that a non-EEC corporate defendant
did not have subsidiaries within the Community.15 5
The Commission has made rather cautious use of the "effects"
doctrine, but none of these decisions has ever reached the Court of
Justice.' 16  In Re the Franco-Japanese Ballbearings Agreement,15 7
152. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 254, 13 Common Mkt. L.R. at 344.
153. See Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Johnson & Johnson, 23 O.J. Eon.
COMM. (No. L 377) 16, 26, 31 Common Mkt. L.R. 287, 302-03 (1980); Liptons Cash
Registers & Business Equip., Ltd. v. Hugin Kassaregister AB, 21 O.J. EUn. COMM. (No. L 22)
23, 34, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. D19, D33 (1977); Commission of the Eur. Communities v.
Hoffmann-La Roche, 19 O.J. Eva. COMM. (No. L 223) 27, 37, 18 Common Mkt. L.R. D25,
D42 (1976), af'd, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 26 Common Mkt. L.R. 211; Commission
of the Eur. Communities v. United Brands Co., 19 O.J. Eva. COMM. (No. L 95) 1, 11, 17
Common Mkt. L.R. D28, D46 (1975), af'd, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207, 21 Common
Mkt. L.R. 429.
154. See Harding, Jurisdiction in EEC Competition: Some Recent Developments, 11 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 423, 425-37 (1977); Norton, The European Court of Justice Judgment in
United Brands: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Abuse of Dominant Position, 8 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 379, 388-95, 413-14 (1979); see also B. BARACK, THE APPLICATION OF THE
COMPETITION RuLEs (ANTITRUST LAW) OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TO ENTER-
PRISES AND ARRANGEMENTS EXTERNAL TO THE COMMON MAucr 40-73 (1981).
155. Although the Court of Justice has indicated its willingness to adopt the "effects"
doctrine in two cases, there were no foreign defendants and no jurisdictional issue was raised
in either case. The first case was Bguelin Import Co. v. S.A.C.L. Import Export, 1971 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 557. See supra text accompanying note 138. The
second case, B.N.O. Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1405, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. 320, involved discrimination based upon nationality
in sports teams. The Court stated that "[t]he rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all
legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are
entered into or of the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the
Community." 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1421, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at 335.
156. In Dyestuffs, the Commission used the "effects" doctrine but the Court of Justice
used the parent/subsidiary principle. The Commission's practice contrasts with strong public
statements indicating acceptance of the "effects" doctrine. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE
Eon. COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 36-39 (1982); INT'L L. ASS'N,
1972 REPORT OF THE FIFry-F FrH CONFERENCE 116-19 (1974) (remarks by E. Zimmerman).
157. 17 O.J. Eon. COMM. (No. L 343) 19, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. D8 (1974).
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the Commission declared that an agreement between Japanese and
French ballbearing manufacturers was intended to raise the price
of French ballbearings and violated Article 85.158 The Commis-
sion, however, imposed no sanctions.
The Commission used a similar approach in Re the French and
Taiwanese Mushroom Packers. 59 The Commission found that five
French corporations had agreed with a Taiwanese export associa-
tion to fix the price of mushrooms in Germany.16 0  Although it
fined the French producers and ordered all parties to terminate the
agreement, the Commission declined to fine the Taiwanese export
association.' 6' It did so on the grounds that the association could
not have had notice of a Commission announcement warning Japa-
nese corporations that it had adopted the "effects" doctrine.16 2 The
Commission refrained from imposing sanctions in a recent case in
which a British corporation violated Community antitrust laws two
years before the United Kingdom's accession into the EEC.6 3
Only once has the Commission fined a non-EEC corporation
without subsidiaries in the EEC. In Commission of the European
Communities v. Members of the Genuine Vegetable Parchment
Association,6 4 the Commission found that only four Community
nations had firms manufacturing vegetable parchment and that
none exported parchment to EEC countries in which competitors
were based. 65 A Finnish company was also part of the agreement
and had rights over the Danish vegetable parchment market. 16
The Commission fined a French and four German corporations as
well as the Finnish company. 6 7  The Finnish company did not
raise the jurisdictional issue and the case was not appealed.
158. 17 O.J. Eon. COMM. (No. L 343) at 26, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D18-D19.
159. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29) 26, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. D83 (1975).
160. 18 O.J. EUn. COMM. (No. L 29) at 29, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D90.
161. 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 29) at 30, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D92.
162. 18 O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. L 29) at 29, 15 Common Mkt. L.R. at D90. In the
announcement, the Commission explicitly embraced the "effects" doctrine. 15 J.O. COMM.
Eun. (No. C 111) 13 (1972).
163. Commission of the Eur. Communities v. Associated Lead Mfrs. 22 O.J. Eon.
COMM. (No. L 21) 16, 24 Common Mkt. L.R. 464 (1978).
164. 21 O.J. Eon. COMM. (No. L 70) 54, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. 534 (1977).
165. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) at 55, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 537-38.
166. 21 O.J. Eon. COMM. (No. L 70) at 60, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 544-45.
167. 21 O.J. Eon. COMM. (No. L 70) at 65, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. at 552. The Finnish
company was fined 15,000 European Units of Account. Id. On the day the Commission
issued this decision, one Unit of Account was equal to U.S. $ 1.20238. 20 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 312) 1 (1977).
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While the Commission may be tempted by the "effects" doc-
trine, the Court of Justice has shown its preference for other princi-
ples. By ignoring the separate corporate personalities of parent and
wholly-owned subsidiaries, the Commission and Court reach for-
eign companies that engage in practices violative of EEC antitrust
norms through subsidiaries within the Community. By thus locat-
ing conduct within the EEC, the Commission and Court are reem-
phasizing traditional territorial principles.
If a trend can be identified in the EEC's first decade of anti-
trust enforcement in the international field, it is a shift away from
the "effects" doctrine. In this respect, the EEC's practice contrasts
with that in the United States. Although courts in the United States
are using concepts increasingly remote from territorial principles,
the EEC has developed and utilized principles which permit vigor-
ous enforcement of Articles 85 and 86, and yet remain territorial. In
so doing, the EEC has probably developed principles more consist-
ent with the doctrines of public international law.
III. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL' LAW
International law is generally defined as the set of binding
rules that governs the conduct and interrelationship of sovereign
states and of other entities having international personality. 6 8
States are the primary subjects of international law, and the "sover-
eignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doc-
trine of the law of nations."169 Two of the principal corollaries of
the sovereignty and equality of states are "(1) a jurisdiction, prima
Jacie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population liv-
ing there; [and] (2) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclu-
sive jurisdiction of other states." 70
Sovereignty, jurisdiction and territory are thus closely related
notions. Sovereignty, an essential ingredient of statehood, involves
freedom from external control.' 7 1 Jurisdiction, a more positive
. 168. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(6th ed. 1979); J.G. STARKE, supra note 33, at 1; G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 3 (4th
ed. 1981).
169. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 287.
170. Id.
171. See D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 284; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 168,
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concept, involves a state's power to make and enforce laws. 172
Territory is what defines the scope of jurisdiction.17 3
One of the primary functions of international law is the legal
protection of statehood "through the creation of limitations on the
degree to which one State can legally encroach on the territorial,
demographic or jurisdictional sphere of another."1 74 A fundamen-
tal distinction, however, is drawn between matters of private and
public law. The rules of private international law permit a court to
take jurisdiction over civil matters notwithstanding that relevant
conduct may have occurred in a foreign country. 75  The applica-
tion of public law to conduct by foreigners abroad is, instead,
generally deemed a violation of international law unless based on
accepted jurisdictional principles. 76
The underlying reasons for the different treatment of foreign
conduct in matters of public and private law are that public laws
prohibit what are considered to be public rather than private inju-
ries and are generally enforced by governmental agencies. The
potential for international conflict is greater in public than in pri-
vate law cases because public laws reflect a sovereign's notions of
ordre public and are enforced by the sovereign itself.177 Further-
more, no issue regarding the application of foreign law arises since
one sovereign's enforcement entities are usually neither empowered
to enforce nor interested in enforcing the public laws of another
country. 178  Finally, the application of a nation's public laws to
conduct in another country amounts to imposing public order legis-
lation in the territory of another state, thereby violating the latter's
right, sanctioned by international law, to be the prima facie exclu-
sive source of law within its own territory. 179
Antitrust legislation is generally considered public law, and
the application of antitrust laws to foreign conduct is limited to the
same extent as more traditional public laws such as criminal
172. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 198; D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 599.
173. See D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 599; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 168,
at 72; J.G. STARKE, supra note 33, at 262.
174. Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, 92 RECUEIL DES CouRs
5, 166 (1957).
175. See supra note 34; infra note 218.
176. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 298-300. See also supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
177. See Jennings, supra note 4, at 519.
178. See K. BREwSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 339 (1958).
179. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 298; Fitzmaurice, supra note 174, at 167.
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laws.180 Defining the limitations that international law places on a
nation's prescriptive jurisdiction in public matters is not a simple
task. The inquiry must begin with an examination of the sources of
international law.
The most authoritative statement of the sources of interna-
tional law is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.'"' It states that the Court must base its decisions on trea-
ties, international customary law, the general principles of law
recognized by the civilized nations and, lastly, the judicial decisions
and teachings of individuals highly regarded in the legal field.1 8
No countries have concluded treaties permitting one nation to apply
its antitrust laws to conduct in a second nation.18 3 Much has been
written, however, about pertinent customary international law and
a 1935 study conducted at Harvard University resulted in the highly
regarded Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime. 184
The Harvard study begins its examination of criminal jurisdic-
tion by noting that the right to validly prescribe penal laws is based
on five general principles. 8 5 They consist in: (1) the territorial
principle, which confers jurisdiction when criminal conduct occurs
within the prescribing nation's territory, (2) the nationality princi-
ple, which permits a sovereign to criminalize conduct by its citizens
regardless of where the conduct takes place; (3) the protective
principle, which provides jurisdiction when national interests have
been injured by completely foreign conduct; (4) the universality
principle, which applies to such crimes as piracy and provides
jurisdiction to any sovereign that captures the criminal; and (5) the
passive personality principle, which provides jurisdiction over con-
duct by a foreigner causing injury to a citizen of the prescribing
nation while that citizen is in a foreign country.8 6
The territorial and nationality principles are the most widely
accepted bases for jurisdiction. 87 The most relevant to antitrust
180. See supra note 32.
181. I.C.J. STAT., art. 38.
182. Id.
183. There are some international guidelines and agreements for consultation and
cooperation in international antitrust matters. See, e.g., B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKETr AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 779-92, 808-15 (1979).
184. 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harv. Research].
185. Id. at 445.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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matters are the territorial and protective principles. 8  The territo-
rial principle permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a crime even
when the crime was not entirely committed within the prescribing
nation's territory. Article 3 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime reads:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime commit-
ted in whole or in part within its territory.
This jurisdiction extends to
(a) Any participation outside its territory in a crime com-
mitted in whole or in part within its territory; and
(b) Any attempt outside its territory to commit a crime in
whole or in part within its territory. 89
The comment to Article 3 notes that the territorial principle
has expanded to include crimes committed only in part within the
territory of the nation asserting jurisdiction. 90  The enlargement of
the territorial principle was necessary because "with the increasing
facility of communication and transportation, the opportunities for
committing crimes whose constituent elements take place in more
than one State have grown apace."' 9'
From this expansion, two derivative territorial principles have
developed. The subjective territorial principle establishes jurisdic-
tion over crimes commenced within a state but completed
abroad.9 2 The objective territorial principle provides jurisdiction
over a crime begun outside a state "but consummated within its
territory." 1 93
Much of the controversy regarding the use of the objective
territorial principle stems from the fact that the Harvard Draft
Convention does not specify exactly what must occur in the terri-
tory of the prescribing nation in order for it to assume jurisdiction
over all of the conduct in question. The comment on the objective
territorial principle includes, for the most part, cases in which acts
188. Territory is the jurisdictional basis generally used in antitrust cases. The protective
principle is relevant only to the extent that the "effects" doctrine is considered protective
rather that territorial. For a rare example of the application of the nationality principle in
antitrust matters, see Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
189. Harv. Research, supra note 184, at 439.
190. Id. at 484.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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considered to be constituent elements of a crime occurred in two
states and which permitted the state suffering the effects to exercise
jurisdiction.19 4  The comment notes, however, that use of effects
alone as the criterion for jurisdiction can lead to troublesome results
as in the case in which a German court convicted a Frenchman of
sedition for shouting "Vive la France" near the German border "on
the ground that the cry was heard in Germany and hence took
effect there as a crime." 195
Only one case on point has been decided by the Permanent
Court of International Justice. In the "Lotus" case,19 6 a French
ship, the Lotus, sank a Turkish ship, the Boz-Kourt, on the high
seas killing eight Turkish nationals. Upon the ship's arrival in Tur-
key, Lieutenant Demons, captain of the Lotus, and the rescued
captain of the Turkish ship were arrested and charged with man-
slaughter. 1 7  Ignoring French protests, a Turkish court convicted
the Frenchman and sentenced him to pay a fine and serve eighty
days in prison. 198
The French government challenged Turkey's assertion of juris-
diction on the grounds that the crime, being one of omission,
occurred on a French ship and that, therefore, French penal laws
applied."99 In holding that the assertion of Turkish penal laws
conformed with international law, the Court stated:
The offence for which Lieutenant Demons appears to have been
prosecuted was an act-of negligence or imprudence-having
its origin on board the Lotus, whilst its effects made themselves
felt on board the Boz-Kourt. These two elements are, legally,
entirely inseparable, so much so that their separation renders the
194. Id. at 488-94. The comment includes a variety of cases in which jurisdiction was
asserted notwithstanding the fact that the crime originated in a different country. The
comment provides few indications as to what the essential requisites are for asserting jurisdic-
tion based on this principle. Either conduct or adverse effect is apparently a minimal
requirement, but questions such as whether the conduct must be criminal in both jurisdic-
tions are left unanswered.
195. Id. at 494 (citing Judgment of Dec. 23, 1889, Reichsgericht, W. Ger., 20 Ents-
cheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 146). This is an instance in which "the objective
principle is pressed to a point at which its application is distinguished with difficulty from the
application of the 'principle of protection.' " Id.
196. Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9 (Judgment of
Sept. 7).
197. Id. at 10-11.
198. Id. at 10-12.
199. Id. at 7.
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offence non-existent. Neither the exclusive jurisdiction of either
State, nor the limitations of the jurisdiction of each to the occur-
rences which took place on the respective ships would appear
calculated to satisfy the requirements of justice and effectively to
protect the interests of the two States. It is only natural that each
should be able to exercise jurisdiction and to do so in respect of
the incident as a whole. It is therefore a case of concurrent
jurisdiction.200
Commentators in the United States have frequently cited the
"Lotus" case for the proposition that the Alcoa "effects" doctrine is
consistent with the objective territorial principle and with interna-
tional law.201  Commentators elsewhere have concentrated, in-
stead, on the location of the constituent elements of an antitrust
offense and have preferred conduct rather than effects within a
territory as the proper basis for the objective territorial princi-
ple.20 2  This has been particularly evident in five conferences of the
International Law Association (I.L.A.) in which the jurisdictional
limits of antitrust legislation have been a major topic of discus-
sion. 03
In 1972, the I.L.A. adopted the Resolution on the Extraterri-
torial Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation .2 04 The Resolu-
tion represents a stalemate between United States and traditional
European views on what is required for the assertion of jurisdiction
200. Id. at 30-31.
201. See, e.g., K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 295-301
(1958); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A
COMPARATIVE GUIDE 32-33 (1979); Jones, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Antitrust: An Interna-
tional "Hot Potato," 11 INT'L LAW. 415, 421-22 (1977); Shenefield, The Perspective of the
U.S. Department of Justice, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S.
ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 12 U. Griffin ed. 1979).
202. See, e.g., Riedweg, The Extra-territorial Application of Restrictive Trade Legisla-
tion-Jurisdiction and International Law, ILA FIFTY-FIRST CONF. REP., supra note 6, at 374-
79; Jennings, The Limits of State Jurisdiction, 32 NOrtDISK TIDSSKRHFr FOR INTERNATIONAL RET
209, 214-16 (1962); Taylor, The Extraterritoriality of the Australian Antitrust Law, 13 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 273, 285-88 (1979); Triggs, Extraterritorial Reach of United States Anti-
Trust Legislation: The International Law Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a
Uranium Producers' Cartel, 12 MELB. U.L. REV. 250, 252-57 (1979). See also supra notes 4,
62-88 and accompanying text.
203. See ILA FiF-Ty-FiRST CONF. REP., supra note 6, at 304-592; INT'L L. ASS'N, 1966
REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 26-142 (1967); INT'L L. ASS'N, 1968 REPORT OF THE
FIFTY-THIRD CONFERENCE 337-404 (1969); INT'L L. ASS'N, 1970 REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FoURTH
CONFERENCE 151-246 (1971); INT'L L. ASS'N, 1972 REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIFrH CONFERENCE
107-75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ILA FIFTY-FIFTH CONF. REP.].
204. ILA FI-rY-FIFrH CONF. REP., supra note 203, at 138-40.
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under the objective territorial principle. Article 3 of the Resolution
requires that conduct which is a constituent element of the offense
occur within the territory of the prescribing state.20 5  Article 5,
instead, is a variation on section 18(b) of the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 206  It was adopted
by the I.L.A. only after the Committee on the Extraterritorial
Application of Restrictive Trade Legislation had proposed eliminat-
ing the "effects" doctrine by declaring it contrary to international
law. 20 7 The "effects" doctrine was thus partially resurrected by the
I.L.A. 208
The I.L.A. also adopted a third jurisdictional theory in re-
sponse to the Dyestuffs decision by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.20 9  Article 4 of the Resolution states that
205. Id. at 139. Article 3 reads:
(1) A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing the conduct of an alien
outside its territory provided-
(a) part of the conduct being a constituent element of the offence occurs within
the territory and
(b) acts or omissions occurring outside the territory are constituent elements of
the same offence.
(2) Whereas municipal law is the sole authority for the purpose of ascertaining
the constituent elements of a particular offence, international law retains a residual
but overriding authority to specify what is or is not capable of being a constituent
element for the purpose of determining jurisdictional competence.
id.
206. Id. Article 5 reads:
A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing conduct that occurs
outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory if:
(a) The conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies,
(b) the effect within the territory is substantial and
(c) it occurs as a direct and primarily intended result of the conduct outside the
territory.
Id. Compare supra note 94.
207. Id. at 170. The Committee had proposed adoption of the following article:
International law, as evidenced by the general practice of States to date, does not
permit a State to assume or exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct of an
alien which occurs within the territory of another State or States solely on the basis
that such conduct produces "effects" or repercussions within its territory.
Id.
208. Article 5 represented the middle choice between three statements of the proper
jurisdictional rule. The Committee opted for the version abolishing the "effects" doctrine. Id.
The third option read: "A State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing conduct
occurring wholly outside its territory if such conduct produces effects within the territory
which the State reprehends." INT'L L. Ass'N, 1970 REPORT ON THE FiFTY-FoURTH CONFERENCE
234 (1971).
209. See ILA FiFTf-FirH CONF. REP., supra note 203, at 107-10.
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"[a] State has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing conduct
originating outside its territory if and in so far as such conduct is
implemented within its territory by any natural or legal person
whose conduct can be attributed to the author of the conduct
performed abroad. 210
The authors of the article's comment considered Article 4 an
application of the territorial principle of jurisdiction. 21 1 They
stressed, however, that when applied to parent/subsidiary relation-
ships, a close tie between the two had to be found before imputing
the actions of one to the other. 212  "The test in each case is whether
the parent company is so directly and intimately connected with
the conduct of the subsidiary that it is proper to regard the conduct
of the subsidiary as that of the parent company as well. 213
Some commentators have lamented the disregard demon-
strated for the legal separation of parent and subsidiary, 214 but the
EEC's approach is much less controversial, as evidenced by the
I.L.A.'s quick approval, than is the "effects" doctrine and is proba-
bly more consistent with international law. The EEC approach is
not significantly different from the typical assertion of jurisdiction
based on the objective territorial principle in which constituent
elements of a crime have taken place in two nations. What makes
the parent/subsidiary notion different is that the conduct is not only
engaged in across national borders but also involves conduct by
separate corporate persons. The EEC has simply chosen to ignore
the separate personality when the subsidiary is controlled by the
parent. A subsidiary's acts are thus either imputable to the parent
or, as in the EEC's more recent formulation, are not distinguishable
from those of the parent.215
210. Id. at 139.
211. Id. at 171-72.
212. Id. at 172.
213. Id.
214. See Jacobs, Extraterritorial Application of Competition Laws: An English View,
13 INT'L LAW. 645, 649 (1979); Mann, The Dyestuffs Case in the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35, 48-50 (1973).
215. Agency and conspiracy notions as means for obtaining subject matter jurisdiction
have been used in the criminal context and were approved by the Harvard Draft Convention
under the heading of "participation." Harv. Research, supra note 184, art. 3(a). The com-
ment on the objective territorial principle also includes a number of cases in which courts
have deemed an individual to have committed a crime in a state when the crime was
committed there by the individual's agents. ld. at 488-90.
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The EEC's recent experience with the objective territorial
principle reveals that jurisdictional tests which depend on the loca-
tion of the unlawful conduct still meet with greater international
approval than do theories based on the location of effects. The
response to the Dyestuffs and Uranium cases indicates that, al-
though public law offenses are becoming more complex and inter-
national, most nations remain jealous of their reserved domains and
fight to preserve their integrity. Territorial limitations to jurisdic-
tion remain the rule in modern criminal procedure, '2 16 and jurisdic-
tional concepts in public law matters that abandon territorial prin-
ciples do not conform with international law.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLES
Whatever decision the Commission may reach with respect to
the jurisdictional questions being raised by IBM, both the balancing
216. Traditional jurisdictional principles, not conflict of laws concepts, are set out in
domestic and foreign penal codes. The New York State Criminal Procedure Law permits
jurisdiction based on the territorial and protective principles. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 20.20
(McKinney 1981); see People v. Puig, 85 Misc.2d 228, 378 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1976). The
California Penal Code grants state courts jurisdiction over crimes committed entirely within
state territory, CAL. PENAL CODE § 777 (West 1970), to crimes committed only in part within
state territory, id. § 778(a), and to crimes committed within state territory by agents of a
foreign participant, id. §§ 778, 778(b). The Model Penal Code relies primarily on territorial
notions. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). But see id. § 1.03(f)
(permits jurisdiction over conduct outside the State when "the conduct bears a reasonable
relation to a legitimate interest of the State").
For a sampling of foreign statutes, see BoRcERLic S-MA.TELov (Criminal Code) §§ 6-10
(0. Krabbe & C. Rasting eds. 1947) (Den.); CODE DE PRocEDuRE P9NALE arts. 689-96 (22e ed.
Petits Codes Dalloz 1980-81) (Fr.); STRA&PnozassoRDNUNG art. 7 (T. Kleinknecht ed. 1981)
(W. Ger.); INDIA PEN. CODE §§ 1-4 (R. Ranchhoddas & D. Thakore 24th ed. 1967); CODICE
PENALE arts. 6-10 (Hoepli ed. 1963) (Italy); BONTET6 JOGSZABALYOK (Criminal Code) §§ 4-7
(1965) (Hung.); ALMINDELIG BORcERLIC STRAm.Fmov (Penal Code) arts. 12-14 (Gr6ndahl &
S~ns ed. 1929) (Nor.); PAK. PEN. CODE §§ 1-4 (R. Nelson & A. Halim eds. 1971); LEY DE
ENJUICIAMIENTO CRIMINAL arts. 14-18 (Reused. 1967) (Spain).
Sovereignty is at issue when crimes are committed across state or national lines. See
generally Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 796-
824 (1955) (the jurisdictional reach of each state is limited by the law of nations and is
implied in the full faith and credit clause). No issue of sovereignty arises, however, when
deciding venue questions in federal cases in which a crime was committed across judicial
district lines. Yet, the United States Constitution mandates that the trial of all federal crimes
(except cases of impeachment) be held in the state in which the crime was committed. U.S.
CoN sT. art. III, § 2, para. 3. The right of trial by jury includes the right to be tried in the
state and federal judicial district in which the crime was committed. U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require trial in the district in which the crime
was committed as a matter of venue. FEr. R. CRuM. P. 18. A federal court may take
jurisdiction over any crime begun, continued or completed in its district. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)
(1976).
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test and the EEC's current approach will undergo scrutiny. This
will hopefully lead to a further clarification of the EEC's jurisdic-
tional analysis and will result in the first foreign judicial examina-
tion of the balancing test.
An elaboration of the EEC's current practice would be, in this
author's opinion, the most favorable result. Such conclusion is
based on the belief that the EEC's practice is more consistent with
international law than is the balancing test. This is so chiefly be-
cause the latter shifts the focus of the analysis from the location of
the conduct to factors such as the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy, the availability of a remedy abroad, or possible effect
upon foreign relations.21 7  A similar change has occurred in choice
of law questions in the United States where the balancing of inter-
ests is generally perceived as the more modern view.218
While territorial considerations may be anachronistic in choice
of law problems, they are fundamental in the field of public inter-
national law. 219  Territory is, of course, a principal ingredient in
the modern conception of statehood. 2 0  The division of the world
into territorial domains is the premise upon which international
law has developed; the protection of territory has been one of its
primary functions. 221
217. See supra notes 104, 108.
218. The first Restatement of Conflict of Laws used territorial and nationality princi-
ples in defining the extent of a state's legislative jurisdiction. The primary source of legislative
jurisdiction was territory. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 55 (1934). Nationality and
"effects" also provided bases for legislative jurisdiction. Id. §§ 63, 65. Personal rather than
subject matter jurisdiction is the focus of the second Restatement. All references to legislative
jurisdiction have been dropped in the second Restatement and the underlying issue is whether
a court's decision to apply its own law is "reasonable in the light of the relationship of the
state and of other states to the person, thing, or occurrence involved." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1969). Current formulations of conflict of laws shift the focus even
further from territoriality. When deciding which law should be applied in a given circum-
stance, a court using interest analysis begins by inquiring "into the policies expressed in the
respective laws, and into the circumstances in which it is reasonable for the respective states
to assert an interest in the application of those policies." R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY,
CoNFICr OF LAWS: CASE-COMMENTs-QUESTIONs 217 (3d ed. 1981). Interest analysis, which
favors application of the forum's law, requires choosing the law of the state having the
greatest interest in the application of its policy. Id.
219. See supra notes 168-79 and acccompanying text.
220. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 109; D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 284;
J.G. STARKE, supra note 33, at 107-08.
221. This view is shared both by conservative thinkers such as Fitzmaurice, see supra
note 174 and accompanying text, and by non-conservatives, see, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra
note 16, at 291-93. The equality of states and the doctrine of non-interference are also highly
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The balancing test includes an evaluation of government inter-
ests but does not focus on the principle of sovereignty, 222 one of the
most fundamental concepts of international law.22 3  An analysis
that stems from the notion of sovereign equality must emphasize the
principle of non-intervention;2 2 4 a restrictive rather than expansive
view of jurisdiction is therefore mandated by international law.
A territorial principle requiring that all elements of a public
law offense occur within the prescribing nation would, of course,
insure judicial non-interference. Such a strict construction, how-
ever, has never been adopted 225 and more flexible territorial con-
cepts have become customary international law.22 1 As pointed out
in the comment to the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Re-
spect to Crime, territorial rules of jurisdiction have adapted to the
times as evidenced by the development and acceptance of the sub-
jective and objective territorial principles.2 2 7
A number of refinements of the objective territorial principle
indicate that territoriality is still a viable jurisdiction concept in
public law matters. At least three subcategories within the objective
territorial principle can be identified. The first involves cases in
which conduct comprising the elements of an offense occurs in
more than one country. This subcategory permits all nations in
which such constituent elements are committed to take jurisdiction
over the entire offense. Both the authors of the Harvard study and
the I.L.A. have accepted this notion. 228
A second subcategory, derived from criminal conspiracy and
agency concepts, permits the exercise of jurisdiction over conduct
by a foreign participant when others have committed an offense
within the prescribing nation's territory. Early EEC cases and the
I.L.A. have adapted this principle to situations in which a foreign
valued among commentators from developing countries. See, e.g., R.C. HI NGORANI, MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-09 (1979).
222. See supra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
223. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 287.
224. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
225. The oldest jurisdictional principle is nationality. Territorial jurisdiction has be-
come most important with the rise of the modern state but has never eliminated nationality as
a basis for jurisdiction. See Keeton, Extraterritoriality in International and Comparative
Law, 72 RECUEIL DES Cooes 283, 287-88 (1948).
226. See supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 193-95, 205 and accompanying text.
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parent violates a nation's competition rules through conduct abroad
which is implemented locally by subsidiaries.
229
The third subcategory permits the exercise of jurisdiction when
an effect is felt but no conduct takes place within the prescribing
nation's territory. In the classic formulation of this subcategory, an
individual standing on one side of a border fires a pistol and kills a
person on the other side. As in "Lotus, " the inseparability of the act
and its effect provides both nations involved with the right to
prosecute.2
30
Since this last subcategory does not involve conduct within the
prescribing nation's territory, 231 it is the easiest territorial principle
to abuse. Indeed, when misused, jurisdiction based on effects "be-
comes no longer a fulfilment, but a reversal, of the principle of
territoriality. 2 32  Application of this jurisdictional basis to anti-
trust is difficult because an antitrust effect
is a far cry from the effect within the territory of the state which
occurs when a murder is committed by shooting across the state
border, or when there is an illegal importation of goods by one
who remains across the border, or when there is a fraud perpe-
trated within the state by a telephone call from across the bor-
der. 2 3 3
Respect for sovereignty and the rule of non-interference requires
that this subcategory be limited to effects "analogous to the arrival
of a bullet from across the border. '"234
CONCLUSION
Neither the balancing test nor the Alcoa "effects" doctrine can
be considered refinements or subcategories of the objective territo-
rial principle. The focus of the balancing test is simply not on
territory and the "effects" doctrine is a distortion of the principles
229. See supra notes 139-48, 209-15 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
231. Some comentators have explained the exercise of jurisdiction in such circumstances
by using notions of "constructive presence" within the prescribing nation's territory. See D.P.
O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 826-27; see also Harv. Research, supra note 184, at 489-90
(discussing Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 17 S.E. 984 (1893)).
232. Jennings, supra note 4, at 519.
233. Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558, 564-65
(1967).
234. D.P. O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 826. See Jennings, supra note 4, at 521.
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announced in the "Lotus" case. As long as sovereign states insist on
retaining nearly exclusive power over their domains, respect for
sovereignty will require ascertaining the location of the unlawful
conduct. Since it is unlikely that states will be prepared to relin-
quish such sovereignty in the near future, territory must remain the
primary basis for jurisdiction for public law. Increasing economic
integration and interdependence are not reasons for ignoring the
doctrine of non-interference. The fact that courts are increasingly
involved in international cases is a compelling reason for adopting
clearer jurisdictional principles consistent with the doctrine of sov-
ereign equality. The development of the objective territorial princi-
ple was a step in this direction; the EEC now has the opportunity of
further refining this jurisdictional principle.
Eric L. Gilioli
